

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT: Project "Treasure Island"

1. Reference is made to memo from Director of Intelligence, Department of Air Force to Director of CI, dated 20 September 1948, same subject.

2. Pursuant to your verbal request, comments on questions as set forth in paragraph 2 of referenced memo are proffered herewith.

3. The first question is: "Will the Air Force be duplicating similar projects being conducted by other agencies?"

If the definition for the pertinent information to be extracted encompasses as stated in the Brief (paragraph 4e), the fields of economic and industrial information related to strategic vulnerability, technical air information, air arm and civil air information, biographical air information and air geography, then we must state that the answer is in the affirmative.

FDB is presently extracting from current Russian newspapers and periodicals information fitting in the categories mentioned above. It must be assumed in this case that FDB would not come under the control of a Library of Congress administration as proposed in paragraph 6 of the Brief, nor that its products could be published by the Library of Congress.

If it were presumed that the Treasure Island Project would, on the other hand, make use of FDB Press Extracts and the JPRS Press Summary as exploitation of the Soviet press, although not under Air Intelligence control, then duplication would still exist in the propo-

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sal (paragraph 5) that the Army Library handle current periodicals and that the Library of Congress handle "government periodicals". Inasmuch as all Soviet periodicals are government periodicals, the distinction is somewhat illogical. Nevertheless, since FDB is at present abstracting all periodicals that it is possible to get from the USSR, duplication would necessarily result.

Although the extent of air geography is not clearly defined, it is believed that in the exploitation of basic information there would be some duplication with the work done by the Army Map Service.

It is also deemed advisable that a close check should be made <sup>of</sup> made with the work done by the Inter-departmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications and the Foreign Economic Administration during the war, plus that which has been done by the Office of International Affairs, Department of Commerce and the Intelligence Division, WDGS, especially <sup>the latter's</sup> ~~their~~ war-time publication entitled "Information from the European Press".

Finally, it is assumed that this proposed project would be coordinated with Project 307-X of the Aeronautical Chart Service.

4. The second question is: "Will the Air Force be operating in its field of dominant interest?"

To <sup>make clear</sup> answer this we must first clarify that the exploitation of open source material involving the selection and extraction of such basic information as exists in foreign publications cannot, with certain technical exceptions, be said to lie within any one field of dominant interest. The dominant interest portrays itself in the interpretation, analysis and use of the raw information. Accordingly, it

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can only be stated that by its very nature, this type of operation must be of great interest to all the IAC agencies.

5. The final question asks: "Will such a project lead to unhealthy competition for translators?" This is modified by a statement in paragraph 3 that only low order, non<sup>technical</sup> translators are envisioned.

In connection with the latter, a small question arises as to how technical air information (paragraph 4e) will be extracted by non-technical translators. It is sincerely believed that experience will quickly show that the employment of low order, <sup>if</sup> low order is really meant, translators is inefficient, time-consuming and costly. Thus, the administration of the proposed project would quickly be looking for the best-trained linguists they could find, which would then put in the field another competitor for experienced and qualified linguists and translators. This would have to be done if only in self-defense against mostly unconscious and in-deliberate errors. Experience has shown that for every low grade translator one qualified and experienced translator is needed to check and correct and in the end less time would be spent without the low grade translator.

So again, the answer must be mainly affirmative with this <sup>the</sup> modification that competition for translators must result, <sup>but</sup> whether this will be unhealthy or not would depend on whether a <sup>W</sup> coordinated recruitment plan might not be worked out. <sup>2</sup>

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APPENDIX A

1. It is felt that certain premises must first be established before definite statistical data can be established. Accordingly, in reference to the problem, the following premises are assumed:

a. That the fundamental requirements are:

(1) Information on area economy leading to target analysis.

(2) Detailed information on targets.

b. That this will involve a complete research program by FDB.

c. That backlog will be defined as basic information to be gathered from German and Japanese documents primarily. This premise is made on the belief that basic information of the type desired up to 31 December 1944 can most efficiently be obtained from the results of German and Japanese research on the areas concerned.

d. That major emphasis will be placed on sources published subsequent to 31 December 1944.

e. That only two areas will be considered and each one separately, namely, USSR and Satellites.

f. That the information extracted will be supplied to Air Intelligence on check sheets or other agreed upon form, thus eliminating publication problems.

g. That the information under this project is limited to that definitely furnishing air target data or data related to air targets.

h. That for efficiency in the extracting of the press all information of intelligence value will be extracted.

2. Based on these premises and the outline of the Bombing Encyclopedia the following points are established:

a. Backlog of USSR (Prior to 1945)

(1) In the following categories all information has not yet been fully extracted and made available: transport (rail, highway and over-seas), light metals, non-metallic minerals, basic organic and inorganic chemicals, storage facilities, paints--insecticides, naval bases and shipyards, forestry and agriculture. For the extraction of this information we believe that 11 linguists (9 German, and 2 Japanese) would be required. Present T/O makes provision for six of these.

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(2) In conjunction with the work on captured documents it is felt that 3 Russian linguists would be required to work specifically at plugging those gaps in information which appear from the results of research on the captured documents.

b. Backlog of Russian Publications (1945 to present)

(1) In processing the backlog of Russian newspapers (1945 to present) it is felt that only a two-year\* period in general need be considered, i.e. 1945-46. Since JIB undertook the extraction of these newspapers in 1947, it is felt that their extracts, although not complete, are sufficient so that reprocessing would be unwarranted. Therefore, on a two-year basis, these papers would be screened and extracted by 8 linguists.

(2) Relatively little has been done in the extraction of information desired from periodicals for this period. Therefore, it is estimated that all journals for this period will have to be reprocessed and that 32 linguists could accomplish this in two years' time.

(3) The backlog of books for this period would have to be carefully collated in the overall research program with the work that has already been done. On this basis it is estimated that 10 linguists could extract the desired information in two years' time.

c. Current materials

(1) For the extraction of all information of intelligence value from currently available Russian newspapers, it is still believed that 8 linguists are required. The present T/O already provides for these.

(2) For the processing of current Russian periodicals as at present plus the extraction of all information to meet Air Intelligence needs it is believed 16 Russian linguists are required. Eight of these are covered by present T/O.

(3) Receipt of current books in Russian is, of course, erratic. However, a review of shipments over the past several months leads to the conclusion that 5 Russian linguists might be able to process these for the information desired.

d. Satellites backlog (Prior to 1945)

For the extraction of detailed basic information on this area from German documents, it is estimated that 10 German linguists are required. Here again, it is felt that the best

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information on this area was compiled by German research agencies, and not too much has been done.

e. Backlog of Satellite countries' publications (1945 to present)

(1) To process the backlog of newspapers for these countries, a rough estimate of personnel required would be 20 to accomplish this in two years' time.

(2) Since FDB has not had long experience in the regular processing of all Satellite publications, a comparative estimate is made covering both periodicals and books. On this basis 9 linguists would be required.

f. Current Materials

(1) For the extraction of intelligence information from current newspapers from the Satellite areas, 16 linguists would be required. Provision for 8 of these exists in present T/O.

(2) Processing of periodicals as at present plus the extraction of information required by Air Intelligence would require 16 linguists. Eight of these are covered by present T/O.

(3) An estimated additional 7 linguists would be needed to screen and extract current Satellite books and other publications for the requirements of this project.

g. Ancillary personnel

Over and above the number specified for linguists work approximately 30 clerical personnel would be required--16 for USSR and 14 for Satellite material.

h. In summation then the following totals reveal numbers of personnel needed by FDB to fulfill estimated Air Intelligence needs.

1. USSR

Backlog	14
1945-present	50
Current	29
Ancillary	<u>16</u>

109

Less present T/O 22

Additional personnel required 87

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2. Satellite

Backlog	10
1945-present	29
Current	39
Ancillary	<u>14</u>
	92
Less present T/O	<u>16</u>

76

3. Total additional for both areas

163

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